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Este documento analiza las diferencias que existen en los salarios entre el 
sector formal e informal del mercado laboral y estima las ganancias netas 
desde una situación de formalización para los trabajadores, utilizando los 
parámetros de los efectos de tratamiento, particularmente los de: Mínimos 
Cuadrados Ordinarios (OLS), Tratamiento Promedio (ATE), Tratamiento en 
los Tratados (TT) y Tratamiento en los No Tratados (TUT). En general, para 
México desde el año 2000 al 2003, hombres y mujeres con mayores niveles 
de educación poseen una ganancia neta si se cambian hacia el sector 
formal; mientras por contraparte, trabajadores con menores niveles 
educativos tienen un efecto negativo en sus salarios, en el caso de que 
formalicen su situación laboral. Complementando lo anterior, se observa 
que prevalecen grandes diferencias en salarios  de un sector a otro, cuando 
se estudia los efectos condicionales de los tratamientos; sin embargo, esta 
brecha se desvanece ligera pero consistentemente en el tiempo. En el caso 
de los hombres, la mayor medida de diferencia en salarios proviene de 
estudiar la diferencia en salarios usando la media incondicional y el efecto 
simple condicional OLS, los cuales implican una brecha de 
aproximadamente 33.0 por ciento en 2000, la cual se reduce 
consistentemente a 25.3 por ciento en 2003.  En contraste, para el mismo 
período y género, el ATE muestra una brecha mucho menor que es de 14.3 
por ciento para 2000, y reduce su valor a 11.7 por ciento en 2003. Además, 
el TUT para los trabajadores informales es aún mucho menor, ya que se 
reduce de 7.5 a 2.6 por ciento en el período analizado. Las estimaciones 
para mujeres son estadísticamente significativas y cualitativamente 
similares. En esta investigación, la  evidencia sugiere que el ordenamiento 
de los agentes entre sectores, por la vía de auto-selección, explica una 
proporción importante de la diferencia entre salarios formales e informales 
en México. 
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This document analyzes the differences on wages between formal and 
informal labor market and estimate the net gains from formalization using 
the set of treatment effects parameters, namely: Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS), Average Treatment Effect (ATE), Treatment on the Treated (TT), and 
Treatment on the Untreated (TUT). In general for Mexico from 2000 to 2003 
both men and women with higher levels of education have net gains from 
switching to the formal sector, while workers with lower levels of education 
have a negative impact on their expected wages from formalizing. Moreover, 
large differences prevail by studying the conditional treatment effects, yet 
they reduce in the period studied. For men, the larger effect are obtained 
from analyzing the unconditional mean differences and the OLS effect which 
imply a wage gap of around 33.0 per cent in 2000, but steadily reduces to 
reach 25.3 in 2003. In contrast, for the same period and gender, the ATE of 
formality reduces this gap estimation to 14.3 percent and steadily decreases 
to 11.7 percent. Furthermore, the TUT effect of informal workers seems to 
be even smaller and also decreasing in time, from 7.5 to 2.6. The estimations 
and evidence for women are significant, and qualitatively similar. The 
evidence on this paper suggests that sorting through self-selection accounts 



























    Labor markets in Latin America, and particularly in Mexico, present a 
common observed regularity in their structure which differs from those in 
developed countries: a high percentage of their active labor force works in 
activities outside the tax system and (or) without social security coverage. 
This fraction of the population has been known in the literature as the 
informal sector. 
 
    Several studies regarding the informal sector and carried out for Latin 
America by the OECD (1999), the World Bank (2004), and Banco de 
Mexico (2003) present two empirical findings consistent across time: 1) the 
fraction of the total labor force in the informal sector has remained stable and 
persistent over time, particularly in the urban areas where it accounts for 40 
to 60 percent of the active labor force depending of the definition of 
informality used; and, 2) there is a pronounced gap between the observed 
average wages between these two sectors, where formal wages are 
consistently higher than informal ones for both genders across time, in 
particular the informal sector salaries are around 60 to 80 percent of the 
formal ones for the periods analyzed. 
 
    While some analysis have been done for understanding the importance of 
the tax systems and the role of law rigidities in determining the informal 
sector by focusing on an macroeconomic framework, fewer analysis have 
been done to understand the nature of the informal sector as a result of 
individual rational decisions.  
 
    This document presents a proposal for studying the differences in wages 
between the formal and informal sector by studying the rationality of agents' 
labor participation on each sector. Using the wage estimations corrected by 
selection, I calculate alternative treatment effects to measure the gains and 
lose in wages from formalization. For this purpose, I will study the 
determinants of aggregate wage distributions for both the formal and 
informal sectors focusing in the Mexican labor market for the early 2000 
years using a model similar to the seminal model studied by McCall (1970) 
but including a sorting environment similar to that proposed in Willis and 
Rosen (1979) framework. Hence, the model proposed provides an approach 
that combines an equilibrium analysis between sectors and the sorting nature 
of participation decisions with a self selection component in which wages 
are partially determined by the agent's heterogeneity. By studying the 
proposed framework, I am able to answer the following questions: 1) how 
much of the wage inequality is explained by the heterogeneity of the agents 
who works in each sector, and 2) what are the gains or loses from switching 
formality in the labor market conditional on the characteristic of the agents. Ensayos  4
 
        The present document is organized in five sections including this 
introduction. The second section presents some literature and a quick review 
regarding other studies findings for the formal and informal sector. The third 
section presents the characteristics of the data sets I will use for the analysis 
of the Mexican labor market and some of the statistical properties in the final 
data I will use throughout this research. The fourth section presents the 
econometric model I propose to identify the wage inequality determinants 
between formal and informal sectors. The fifth section shows the empirical 
implementation and results of this analysis. The last part of this document 
concludes the analysis and presents the most important findings. 
 
 
2. Formality in the Mexican labor market: some facts 
 
    Most of the work for analyzing the informal sector in developing countries 
have been carried out either by local agencies (in the case of Mexico by the 
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics, and the Central 
Bank, (Banco de Mexico - Banxico); or by international organizations, like 
the World Bank (WB), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This section presents the main 
findings on some of the most representative empirical works carried out for 
studying the informality on Latin America. 
 
Figure 1 
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    The first question to address is to define what the informal sector is, and 
what the implications are of using this definition on the labor force partition. 
In general, Banxico (2003) and The World Bank divide the active labor force 
employment into formal and informal, but distinguishing two types of 
informality: i) entrepreneurs and self employed; and ii) informal salaried 
workers. The first group includes the part of the active labor force that 
produce no agricultural goods and services, which are legal, and with market 
destiny or scope, through firms which are not in the tax system and are 
owned by household sector. The second part includes those salaried workers 
which are not owners of a small firm or beginning a new entrepreneur, yet 
receive an income per hours worked in a non-formal job. Figure 1 presents a 
basic scheme of this decomposition and the estimations for Mexico, using 
data of 2000. 
 
Figure 2 




   
 
    Maloney´s (1998) working paper is one of the pioneering research work 
for studying labor market informality in Latin America using microdata for 
several countries including Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico. 
Maloney finds that in Latin America, small entrepreneurs who does not pay 
taxes and do not have social security are indeed a high percentage of the 
informal sector. In other words, Maloney's hypothesis is that informal sector 
is not a "residual" of the lack of ability of the formal sector to "create 
opportunities", but it represents an option for the potential worker to get 
earnings in a different type of job. In particular, Maloney (1999) logit 
analysis for rotating panels finds that people are more likely to become an 
informal worker if: 1) medical benefits covering are provided for the family 
as a whole by other member, so the worker is not the marginal provider of Ensayos  6
this service; 2) administrative costs for social security are relatively high and 
benefits to worker are of low quality; and 3) high turnover rates within 
formal employment means that workers not accumulate segniority, and 
hence, have a lower opportunity cost in terms of segniority benefits. 
 
Figure 3 
Estimations on formal-informal wages, Mexico 2000-2003 
 
     
    In a recent report for Mexico, the World Bank (2004) devoted a small 
subsection to study the evolution of wage gaps between the formal and 
informal sectors. They defined `informal worker' as all those unprotected by 
labor law, but divided this large sector into two specific groups: 1) owners of 
firms with fewer than 16 employees who do not have social security or 
medical benefits, identified as "informal self-employed"; and 2) employees 
in those small firms, identified as "informal salaried workers". During 2000-
2002, the report finds that there has been an increase in real wages for both 
sectors, followed by a flattening of informal and a fall in- formal wages in 
early 2003. Controlling for relevant characteristics such as basic economic 
background and education, their results show that the wage gap between 
informal and formal workers decreased along the conditional earnings 
(Figure 3 and Figure 4). In this report, they also find a reduction in the wage 
gap between 1997 and 2002, particularly in the lower tail of the conditional 
distribution (Figure 5). 
 
    The findings of the World Bank report for Mexico in 2002, fits in the 
history of Maloney for the rest of Latin America developing countries and 
the findings of Banxico in 2004. Basically, Figure 5 presents the wage 
distribution by formality category for the second quarter of 2002 in Mexico. 
This distribution has the skewness characteristic of the labor markets (Rosen 
and Neal, 1999), but in particular, once we consider the informal sector 
decomposition, the distribution of wages for the informal workers presents, 
relative to the formal sector: 1) lower wages for both types of informality; 2) Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  7 




Informal to formal wage ratio by quantile, Mexico 1997-2002 
Source:  World Bank, 2002. Staff Calculations using the third quarter of ENOE urban population on each year. 















        
     
Figure 5 
Labor income distribution for formal and informal categories,  
Mexico 2002 
Source:  World Bank, 2002. Staff Calculations.   
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     The findings presented above are the basis of analysis for this proposal, 
where the objective is to identify the sources of the skewness of wages 
distribution and the evolution on wages gap by measuring the self selection 
and heterogeneity components, and the possibility of having sector specific 
shocks in productivity. The next section of this proposal presents the 
characteristics of the datasets I will use in my research, and then, I will 




3. Data sets: the Mexican surveys of employment 
 
    For purposes of this analysis, I will use the set of surveys known as the 
National Survey of Employment for Mexico (ENOE). These datasets are 
collected by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and 
Informatics (INEGI) and are the basis for official employment statistics. 
Since 1987 and until 2005, the Surveys of Employment have had the same 
questionnaire information structure including information at individual level 
for potential workers (people with 12 or more years old) on variables such 
as: education, labor participation, hours worked, type of contract and benefit 
received, some questions about social protection coverage or labor force and 
other basic variables as gender, marital status and age. Moreover, it is also 
possible to recover the same information for all the members of the same 
household. Since its first application on the field in 1987, ENOE have had 
three different sampling designs: the first design was operative from 1987 to 
2000; the second from 2001 to 2004; and the third stage beginning 2005. 
 
    The first sampling design divided their data collection into two types of 
surveys: the National Survey of Urban Employment (Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo Urbano, or ENEU), with quarterly data collected since 1987; and the 
National Survey of Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, or ENE), 
with annual data collected from 1996 to 2000. Both ENE and ENEU surveys 
share the same variables and structure and were statistically representative at 
urban and national level respectively but with different time collection and 
sampling structure. On the one hand ENE was a cross sectional survey 
nationwide collected, which is representative for both rural and urban areas 
in Mexico. ENEU, on the other hand, focused only on urban areas
2 but with 
a main advantage over ENE: ENEU is a rotating panel which follows each 
round of workers for 5 quarters. In each ENEU sample there are five cohorts, 
each in a different state of completion in the interview cycle: one-fifth of the 
sample in its first interview, one-fifth in its last (fifth) interview, and three-
                                                 
2 This means that ENEU survey was restricted to areas with more than 100,000 
inhabitants. The geographical coverage on ENEU has changed over time with the 
introduction on new urban areas and currently covers the 45 largest urban areas in Mexico. Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  9 
fifths of the sample in intermediate stages. The ENEU conducts extensive 
quarterly household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan areas for from 
1992 to 2000 and the sample is selected to be geographically and socio- 
economically representative. Additionally, a household identification 
variable permits construction of household variables for purposes of having 
more controls if needed. 
 
    In the second sampling stage, from 2001 to 2004 both ENEU and ENE 
disappear becoming one single nationwide survey: the Quarterly National 
Survey of Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral, or 
ENET). ENET combines the ENE representativeness with the ENEU 
rotating panel structure which allows following every individual for at most 
5 quarters. Specifically, since the second quarter of 2001, the ENET consists 
of a rotating panel data representative for the next mutually exclusive 
aggregate levels: a) National level; b) 48 mayor cities in Mexico; c) 32 
Mexican states; d) four levels of urbanization measured by community 
inhabitants. These multiple representativeness levels allow us to divide the 
sample for analyzing even labor markets for rural and urban areas. 
 
    Finally, since 2005 ENET was the basis for the Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo y Ocupaciones (ENOE) by modifying its questionnaires which 
started to be operational at that year. Using all the ENET row data sets from 
2000 to 2003 with information at individual level, I will build measures on 
wages, education, and sectorial composition, by focusing my analysis in the 
urban labor markets. From there, I will focus my attention on analyzing 
wage structure comparing sectors, but differentiating between males and 
females, given that the variable "number of children", one of the most 




4. Labor market Equilibrium in a two sectors economy 
 
        This section presents the model I will use to characterize the wage 
distribution in both formal and informal sectors, and compare the hypothesis 
of wage differences under alternative structural measures of switch effects. 
Initially, I will assume partial equilibrium analysis, trying to integrate the 
elements from both labor supply and demand, and from there, recover the 
wage distribution of the workers for both formal and informal sector. 
 
        For this purpose I will start by characterizing the possible sources of 
heterogeneity in the observed wage of each market in two sources: 1) A first 
source is due to the tax rate imposed on one sector relative to the other; and 
2) the self selection of the agents between sectors which may induce a 
sorting bias on the observed wages for each sector. Ensayos  10
4.1. A model of labor demand with taxes 
 
 
    This subsection provides a quick and powerful result on labor demand for 
two sectors with different tax structure. For simplicity, let us assume for a 
while that there are two sectors in the economy: F and I. One of them, 
without loss of generality F, is required to pay a wage tax τ per unit of time 
hired in labor while the sector I do not require to pay that tax
3. 
Accountability of tax is at this point exogenous to the sector and this tax is 
returned to the agents in the form of lump-sum transfers, so they do not 
provide additional distortions on the economy. 
 
    Assuming there is competition on the labor market, then for each firm the 
optimal conditions for maximizing profits are equalize the value of the 
marginal unit hired to the wage paid to workers. In this case, this condition 







F ) = (1-τ) W
F = w
F  ( 1 ) 
  
where w
F is the observed wage on the sector F. Following the same 







I ) = W
I = w
I  ( 2 ) 
 
For w
I being the observed wage on the sector I. Hence, on assuming 
technology on each sector is differentiable, the last worker hired in the sector 
should provide the same value of marginal productivity for each of these 













I )  ( 3 ) 
 




I =(1-τ)  W
F / W
I  ( 4 ) 
     
    This simple condition tells us a very powerful history: in any free mobility 
labor market, the ratio of the observed formal to informal wages may obey to 
two sort of differences: 1) one associated to differences in the "net wage" 
ratio paid in each sector, (W
F / W
I); and 2) a second difference associated to 
the tax rate faced by the formal sector market (1-τ). 
 
                                                 
3 The ability to avoid the tax is not endogenously determined in this first approach model. 
This alternative analysis may be considered in a future research. Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  11 
        This first approach model would suggests that a very important 
component for explaining the observed wage differentials between formal 
and informal wages is indeed the tax rate and the economic logic goes as 
follows: provided the value of the marginal productivity of the last unit of 
labor is equal on each sector, then the relative wages observed on each sector 
must be equal to the average tax rate paid on the last marginal unit of labor 
hired. 
 
        Nevertheless, there exists strong evidence suggesting net wages may 
indeed vary between sectors, particularly if the bundle of skills and the price 
per unit of skill are different in each sector. This argument strikes the fact 
that the expected wage, conditional on skills-education on each sector, are 
biased due to the sorting of agents trough a self selection choice. This is the 
second brick of my analysis on wage differentials provide a guide to analyze 
wage evolution, but several question remain to be studied particularly those 
regarding to the average and marginal agents. From the Roy model 
perspective, exist the possibility that the average worker at each sector is 
essentially different from that worker which is on the margin of indecision 
on being or not formal. In a context of heterogeneous outputs on each sector, 
for the same skill and abilities characteristics, this lead us to self selection 
bias on the conditional average wage. 
 
    Therefore, to study the fully wage distribution differences between formal 
and informal sector, and given the lack of pure counterfactual for each agent, 
I will analyze the switching effect of formality using the engineering 
elements of Treatment Effects developed in Heckman and Vyvlacil (2006) 
and studied in detail in the next section. 
 
 
4.2. The labor supply side: characterizing sorting between sectors 
 
    This section presents the model proposal for studying the characteristics of 
sorting model of labor supply markets. By studying the decision of the 
marginal agent for being at the formal and informal sectors, we are able to 
fully characterize the aggregate distribution of wages across sectors and 
study if the distribution of agents characteristics are different among sectors 
(sorting effect by self selection) or if the agents consider informal sector to 
be just an alternative to the formal one which, at the margin, may gives them 
the same (expected) wage.  
 
        The methodology I propose to study then integrates the self-selection 
nature of micro decisions into the sorting macroeconomics framework, and 
from the nature of these two complementary approaches identify the 
aggregate wage distribution which in principle would depend on two type of 
essential factors: 1) those underlying the essential parameters of the Ensayos  12
production function on each sector; and 2) those related to the (given) 
distribution of heterogeneous essential characteristics of the agents.  
 
    Hence, the model can identify decompose the effects of business cycles 
shocks over the wage distributions and identify how much of the observed 
changes in wage distributions between and across sectors are due to 
productivity shocks, and how much are due to sorting of the agents once 
their expectation on wages on wages are fulfilled.  
 
        The model begins with the traditional sequential optimization problem 
where the agent i maximizes the expected net present value of his 
consumption in a time-separable utility function. Hence the objective 
function is of the form: 
 
 
( 5 ) 
 
    Let us assume that, as in the traditional sorting models, the income of the 
agent comes from his labor wage, and that the utility he earns in 




( 6 ) 
 
provided he decides to supply inelastically one unit of labor per period if 
accepts the wage offer he has at hand
4. 
 
    At the beginning of each period, the agent must decide in which sector j 
he wants to work. At this point I will assume that there are two sectors A and 
B which differences will be explored in detail below, this in order to gain the 
insights about more general sector possibilities
5. The agent decides in which 
sector to work by knowing a wage offer which be paid at the end of the 
period with two components: one known by the worker and which depends 
on his characteristics, and a second component which is stochastic but for 
which distribution is known for the agent. 
                                                 
4 In a future research project I will plan to explore the possibility of having both 
consumption and leisure in the utility function, and so having variable labor supply in a 
sorting framework. 
5 In this particular case, I will analyze empirically the implication on "formal" and 
"informal" sector by characterizing the parameters β and the distribution of shocks on each 
sector. Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  13 
        Hence, the wage the agent obtain wi,j,t will be modeled to have two 
components: 1) a piece-rate wage conditional on some observed and 
common known characteristics of the agent Xi,t which prices by sector and 
period βj,t are determined by the productivity essentials of the sector; and the 
second component ui,j,t which represents some random component, in 
principle different on each sector, reflecting some uncertainty for working on 
a particular sector. This uncertainty is hence exogenous to the agent, but the 
distribution of these shocks and its parameters are known for the agent ex 
ante. Hence the effective wage the agent receives at the end of the period is a 
linear function of the form: 
 
 
( 7 ) 
 
where βj,t is the price rate paid at sector j ∈{F,I} for each of the observed 
skill characteristics X of the agent i at period t (which in principle may be 
time-dependent); and the error term ui,j,t shows the sector-individual specific 
random term to the period of time t. I will assume that the two terms are non-
correlated, so the productivity shocks are independent of the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the agent. For purposes of my analysis, I will assume that 
skills are characterized by the years of education of the worker, and a series 
of dummy variables that may capture the different yearly rates of return to 
different levels of education. 
 
    From equation ( 7 ), let me notice one very important feature for this 
model: there are two different types of wage distributions relevant for our 
model: 1) that wage distribution which is relevant for the decision of the 
agent; and 2) the wage distribution for the whole market which result from 
the sorting and self selection of the agents across sectors. 
 
    At an individual level, the wage distribution from which the agent decide 
where sector to work relies on the distribution of the sector shocks { ui,F,t , 
ui,I,t,} and the productivity-prices of their heterogeneous abilities βj,t. At this 
stage I will assume that the skill prices are known, and at sometime constant, 
so all the source of randomness on the wage distribution for the agent are 
result of the sector specific random shocks. 
 
    At this stage, and following the McCall original model as in Sargent and 
Lvunquist (2004), I will assume that both sector productivity shocks are 
draw from a jointly i.i.d. normally distributed on time, equal for all the 
agents i∈{1,...,I}, and these shocks are independent of the agent i 
heterogeneity ∀ i∈{1,...,I}. Hence the shock distribution for each sector is of 
the form: 
 Ensayos  14
 
( 8 ) 
 
    Then, using these assumptions, the distribution of wage across sector is 
indeed a random variable whose joint distribution at each period is 
characterized as follows: 
 
 
( 9 ) 
 
    Hence, while the expected wage of the agents relies on their abilities, the 
variance of the wage will depend on the stochastic term shocks ui,j,t. 
 
    Given the known bi-normal distributions, and provided the distribution of 
heterogeneous characteristics of Xi,t we are able to find the whole 
characterization of the value function and how, given these variables, the 
agent have two optimal policy functions of the "reservation wage type": one 
is given by the reservation wage of working or not, wi,t⁰, and the second one 
identify the reservation wage for switching or working in one particular 
sector, wi,t
S. In particular, we will observe that the agents decide to work if: 
 
 
( 10 ) 
 
    On the other hand, once the worked has decided to work, the agent will 
decide to work in a sector (let me use without loss of generality sector F as 
the basis) or switching to this sector if the following condition occurs: 
 
 
( 11 ) 
 
otherwise the agent will stay at the sector originally selected. Graphically, 
the model expects to find some functional decision forms for the policy 
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Figure 6 












       
        From the full wage distribution, conditional on observed skill 
characteristics, we identify if such a wage distribution is then different 
among sectors, and how much of such a difference is explained only by 
differences on the characteristics that determine formal sector decisions, and 
how much are only due to the tax rate applied for that agent. Moreover, these 
distributions also help us to analyze the determinants of the "size" of the 
sectors. 
 
    At  this  stage  of  this  research proposal, I will focus on studying the 
marginal values of switching between sectors given the agent has decided to 
participate, so I will only study those agents which are employed in the labor 
market and the analysis of multichoice switching decisions and effects 
between being out of the labor force are left for a future research. 
 
    Then, for a worker which has decided to work, the sequential problem can 
be reduced to a set of functional equations, which Bellman representation for 
each given sector is given by a recursive equation showing the value of 
being employed at that sector at the current wage offer: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { } 1 , , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , , , ) , , ( , , , , max + + + + + = t B i t A i t i t t j i t j i t t j i t j i w t j i w w V E w V E w V β β   (12) 
 For   {} I F j , ∈  
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    Given the agent has decided to participate in the labor force
6, each period 
he faces the decision of entering or not to a particular sector. In this case, this 
decision can be modeled using the latent variable approach associated to 
select "being in the formal" sector. Each period the agent has to decide 
which sector to work in given he has a wage in hand at each sector. Let us 
define the value function the agent i may have for being at sector j as Vi,j,t In 
particular, In this document I will analyze the case for two sector such that  
j∈{F=Formal, I=Informal}.The agent then has the following optimal 





    Then,  provided  the  value  of  being at each specific sector, the agent 
decides which sector to work. Without loss of generality, let me assume Vi,j,t 
is represented by a linear function of some observed characteristics for the 




( 13 ) 
 
    I will assume at this stage that the decision the variables that characterize 
the choice of sector have two orthogonal components so Yi,t⊥ei,j,t, and also 
πj,t⊥ei,j,t avoiding the possibility of having random coefficients on the choice 
equation. 
 
    In this case, the sector selection criteria for agent i is given by a latent 
variable    that measures the net benefit of being at the formal (or 








                                                 
6 At this first stage, I will work only with those agents who are already in the labor market, 
and not developing the possibility of multi-stage self selection were the agents can choose 
working or not, and then which sector work on. On a later stage of the research I will 
include this possibility by using a multinomial decision to correct this multilevel self 
selection possibility. 
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or grouping terms, 
 
 
( 15 ) 
 
    If we simplify and collect terms, the selection variable is then given in 
terms of the variable: 
 
 
( 16 ) 
 
    In other words, the agent will decide to work in the formal sector if the 
utility value from being in the formal sector is higher than its second option, 
otherwise he will optimally chose to go into the informal sector. Then the 
selection rule in the Willis and Rosen sense given by the variable   where 
the agent will select being at the formal sector if and only if   > 0, while 
he would choose go to the informal sector otherwise. Then, the probability of 
observing an agent in the formal or informal sector, or propensity score for 
each agent, is therefore defined in terms of the index variable   as 
follows: 
 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) ( , , , , , , , , , , , , > = > − Π = > − = = t i t i t i t i t i t i t I i t F i t i t i P Z P V V P F j P γ ε   (17) 
 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) ( , , , , , , , , , , , , ≤ = ≤ Π = ≤ − = = t i t i t i t i t i t i t I i t F i t i t i P Z P V V P i j P γ ε  
(18) 
 
    Hence, the observed wages have a self-selection component associated to 
the decision of being or not part of the formal or informal sector, which can 
be modeled in the same spirit of Willis and Rosen (1979) using the Roy 
model framework exposed in Maddala (1983). Assuming the characteristics 
associated to the participation decision on formal sector ξi,t is normal 
distributed, we can simplify using Heckman (1979) error decomposition and 
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( 22 ) 
 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 
( 24 ) 
 
    For purposes of this analysis, I will assume the set of equations satisfy the 
exclusion restrictions on the variables Xi and Yi in order to identify the set of 
relevant parameters. Once the model have included the nature of the 
selectivity of the agents to participate in each type of the labor market, the 
possible sources of wage variability associated with the heterogeneity of the 




4.3. Wage differences and the formalization treatment effects 
 
    This section develops the following policy question: what would be the 
expected benefit from "formalizing"
7 an informal worker? Moreover, is there 
any wage gain from moving a worker from the formal to the informal sector? 
In particular, if the benefits are fully characterized by the wage the agent 
earns in each sector conditional on his education, once we consider the self-
selection bias, what would be the impact of switching agents between 
sectors? 
 
    A useful tool for answering this sort of questions is the set of treatment 
effects corresponding to this experimental simulation. In particular, 
following Heckman and Vytlacil (2006) we can study at least 4 particular 
treatment effects, and form these estimations and controlling by self 
selection, infer the impact on the expected effect from switching across 
sectors. 
 
    Assuming the outcomes (wages in this case) depends on the same set of 
variables Xt in the two sectors, and that the coefficients on the outcome 
equation are the same for all the agents (i.e. at this stage I will not permit 
                                                 
7 By formalization I mean moving a worker, keeping his education and background, from 
an informal sector to be a formal wage worker. Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  19 
heterogeneity on the returns of the variables Xt) then the first treatment effect 
is given by the ordinary least squares difference ΔOLSi conditional on this 






    Given the nature of the sorting and self selection of the agents across 
sectors, it is possible that the previous effect does not reflect the average gain 
for a worker from switching from formal to informal, hence, an unbiased 
treatment estimators is proposed to be the average treatment effect ΔATE 
given by the following definition: 
 
 








t t i t I t F t i t I i t F i t i t j i λ ρ λ ρ β β − − − = − =   (26) 
 
    In this second treatment effect, the control function to address the self 
selection bias is given by   and represents the correction 
for this average treatment. 
 
    Finally, two other treatment effects may be interesting to consider namely: 
the treatment on the treated ΔTTi , and the treatment on the untreated ΔTUTi 
defined as follows: 
 




t t i t j i i t i t I i t F i t i t j i λ ρ σε + Δ = = − =   (27) 




t t i t j i i t i t I i t F i t i t j i λ ρ σε + Δ = = − =  
(28) 
 
   In a environment where free mobility across sector occurs, such as in the 
model of labor demand studied in the previous section, we would expect that 
conditional on the agents characteristics the net wages in the two sectors, 
must be the same, or quite similar, unless that there are sector specific skills 
and different prices per unit of skill. This result may be challenged by the 
observed wage differences of the previous studies. The next section presents 
the definition of formality I will follow using ENET, and the empirical 
implementation of the models proposed to show the estimations regarding 
the set of treatment effects for the Mexican labor market. 
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5. Empirical implementation 
 
    To study the wage differences between formal and informal sector in the 
Mexican labor market, I will use all the information provided by the ENET 
and from the system of equations ( 19 ) to ( 24 ) defined in the previous 
sections I will build and analyze the different unconditional and conditional 
treatment effects, corrected and not by self-selection. In this case, I used the 
quarterly databases from 2000 to 2003 to study the evolution of wages and 
their estimations for the treatment effects already defined, separating each 
sample between men from women, as this second group includes key 
information not provided for the first group. 
 
    The first important question is the definition of formality and informality I 
will use for the rest of the document. In particular, using the information of 
ENET questionnaire and an approach close to the one exposed in Banxico, I 
will infer and define formality in terms of the labor contractual 
specifications, which are close related to the payment of labor income taxes. 
In particular, for purposes of this analysis, I propose the following definition: 
 
Definition: An informal employed worker is a person who satisfies 
simultaneously the following four conditions: 
 
i) Works for a positive earning compensation for her (his) work at the labor 
market during a positive number of hours per week. 
 
ii) Does not receive at least one of the following benefits mandatory by law: 
IMSS, ISSSTE, INFONAVIT; SAR, or Private Medical Insurance. 
 
iii) Works in an economic unit (firm) without official registration; 
 
iv) The economic unit (firm) where she (he) works does not have more than 
50 employees, including the employer. 
 
    This  informality  definition  includes  three  main  informal  employment 
categories: self-employed (one-worker self managed firm), informal 
employers, and informal salaried worker. The main difference between the 
definition of formality of this proposal and the previous definitions studied 
by the World Bank and Banxico is the inclusion of the condition of "official 
registration of the economic unit" (the third condition in my definition of 
formality.) While this question is part of the ENET basic questionnaire, the 
previous definitions of formality ignores it. At this stage, I will follow this 
alternative definition as one contribution to the discussion over the previous 
analysis, and I will let the possibilities of studying the robustness of my 
results for different measures of formality for a future research. 
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Figure 7 






























































































     ENET  datasets  for  each  quarter provides us information on basic 
socioeconomic background for more than 120,000 observations of people 
who potentially participates in the labor market. From there, I used the 
people who are currently working at the labor market at each quarter I had 
information, resulting in more than 85,000 observations per cross section 
quarter. Using this data and the definition proposed, the composition of 
formality for 2000 to 2003 shows the relative size of the informal sector has 
been steady and around 20 per cent of the total labor participation. This 
estimation differs from the size studied in the other analysis due to the 
alternative definition I am proposing, and the sources of difference are the 
inclusion of official registration as a filter of informality. Following my 
definition, the main source of informal employment is given by the "self-
employed and employer" category, which represents around than 65 percent 
of the informal employment. Figure 7 shows the composition and evolution 
of employment by category for Mexico in the period studied, while Table 1 
in the appendix shows more precise estimations by gender. 
 
    The second question is the evolution of average wages (labor income per 
hour) for both sectors. For this purpose I decomposed the databases for 
studying the wage evolution by gender to use the different information 
regarding the number of children they have (women has explicitly this 
question, while information on men is not reported.) ENET databases shows 
the net of taxes labor income of the workers, so, by using the number of 
hours worked per week, I can estimate the wage-per-hour for each worker 
net of taxes, and from there, estimate the log-wage which will be my Ensayos  22
"dependent variable". For both men and women, the average log-wages 
shows a steady but low increase in real terms for both formal and informal 
markets. Nevertheless, the most important feature of having log-wages is 
that we can compare the percentage gap between formal and informal sector. 
This unconditional average wage difference has been reducing for both men 
and women from 33 percent and 54.2 percent in 2000/02 respectively, to 
25.3 percent and 45.3 percent in 2003/01. Figure 8 and Figure 9 present 
these findings in more detail. 
 
    Once the time series of wages are estimated by gender, the next question 
is what are the sources of these wage gaps, and particularly if such a gap 
persists once we consider the self selection component of the agents which 
may bias the unconditional differences and the ordinary least squares 
differences. These unbiased effect estimations are precisely the treatment 
effects the next section is focused in gathering. 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
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Source: Own estimations using ENET 2000-2003. 
 
 
5.1. Formal-informal wage system of equations 
 
    This section presents a brief analysis of the results on the estimations for 
the self selection wage equations using the two stage procedure described in 
Section 4. In a first stage of estimation, I characterize the choice of formality 
and from there infer the full wage distributions for both formal and informal 
sectors identifying the wage counterfactual of each worker. In the second 
stage, I will use these wages distributions to build the different treatment 
effects from "formalizing" and "un-formalizing" a worker conditional on his 
or her characteristics. 
 
    Following  the  basic  statements  of human capital theory, I used as 
independent "outcome variables" (i.e. independent variables in the wage 
equations) a set of measures which could persist independently of the sector 
in which the worker is, and at the same time, which are close related to the 
level of human capital the worker possesses. Hence, I included the labor 
experience
8, experience squared, and a set of seven dummies for controlling 
rates of return for different levels of education: less than basic education, 
basic education, lower secondary education, high school, technical 
education, professional, and graduate. Each set of models were estimated by 
gender to capture the information on number of children in the case of 
                                                 
8 Experience is traditionally measured as “age” minus “years of education” minus “6”. Ensayos  24
women. On the other hand, I used a larger set of variables to model the 
participation decision choice including those related to human capital 
already defined in the wage equation and new information among which I 
included: the marital status, the number of children (for women), the status 
in the house of the worker (head of the household or not), and one dummy 
for each state (32 in total) using Mexico City as exclusion base for these 
dummies. 
 
    The set of estimations for the equation of participation for both men and 
women are included in Table 2a and Table 2b in the appendix to this 
document, for each of the cross section studied from 2000/02 to 2003/01. All 
of the participation models were statistically significant using the LRχ² 
criteria.  
 
        For both men and women, participation in the formal labor market is 
consistently negative related to the experience variable but positively 
correlated to the dummimes for level of education. This would suggest that 
people with higher level of human capital are less likely to be an informal 
worker, but experience measured in years correct downward the rates of 
return of education. In any case, the coefficient associated to this variable is 
rather small, and the effect of the level of education captured by the 
dummies is high enough to measure the rates of return by level of education 
in the wage effect. Also, for both men and women the probability of being in 
the formal sector increases if the worker is head of the household, which 
could reflect the fact that people with more responsibilities may prefer being 
at the formal sector looking for the protection of health and social security 
system mandatory by law. This last result also reinforces for the case of men 
in which the probability of being formal increases between 3 to 5 percent if 
he is married. This hypothesis nevertheless has a counterpart with the 
positive and significant coefficient that number of children has in the 
probability of being in the formal sector for women, where each additional 
children reduces the probability of being at the formal sector between 0.5 
and 1 percent. The set of dummies related to the Mexican states 
identification in the survey shows mixed effects on their signs and 
statistically significance, but in the majority of the cases are statistically 
significant and modifies the probability of being formal with respect to 
Mexico City (Distrito Federal) in some cases for 10 to 11 percent. This 
heterogeneity in significance and size of the effects of each state may reflect 
in a broad way the differences in the development of the informal sector in 
each state relatively to Mexico City. 
 
    In order to estimate the formal and informal wage equations, I considered 
as outcome variables only the set of information regarding the human capital 
of the worker. I estimated the Mills ratio for each sector using the 
participation choice from the probit estimated in the first stage, and in the Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  25 
second stage I estimated the two sets of equation for each gender, and for 
each quarter studied. The full set of estimations is presented in Tables 3a to 
4b in the appendix of this document. It worth to notice that the coefficient in 
these set of equations does not have any direct interpretation as returns to 
education as in the traditional Mincer equation, given that the interest of the 
model is to estimate the expected treatment effects of switching from one 
sector to the other. Rather, at this estimation stage the properties we are 
interested in studying for the model are: 1) the statistical significance of the 
coefficients, 2) the difference in the coefficients which are the unbiased 
estimation of the difference in the effect of each independent variable from 
switching, and 3) if the self-selection variable explains some of the 
variability in wage equation for each sector. 
 
    In all of the models, all of the variables considered in each of the wage 
equations turned to be significant and with the expected sign in experience 
and experience squared, but as noticed before, some negative and significant 
signs on basic education level dummies. For this case, the inclusion of the 
Mills ratio, which turns to be significant in all of the models for both men 
and women, is the main cause of such changes. In any case, the analysis of 
the difference in these coefficients is the source of interest for our analysis 
and will be explained in details below. The fitted properties of models (R-
square) for the formal wages are between 0.2989 and 0.3147 for men, and 
0.3394 and 0.3705 for women. In the case of informal wage equation the R-
square is around 0.0945 and 0.1168 for men, and 0.0876 and 0.1227 for 
women. 
 
    The unbiased estimations of the difference in the coefficients, corrected by 
self-selection, are interesting in the sense that they show some important 
effects of being or not a formal worker over the wage of the worker, 
conditional on the level of education. Figure 10 presents these estimations. 
 
    In general, for the 2000/02-2003/01 period, people with higher levels of 
education have a net gain from switching to the formal sector. Nevertheless, 
there is another huge impact by levels of education which turns to be the 
most important effect for purposes of this analysis. In the case of men, 
workers with less or equal education equivalent to high school would earn 
significantly more in the informal sector than in the formal sector, while 
workers with technical education, college, or graduate studies, have a higher 
return on wage in the formal sector compared to the one they obtain in the 
informal one. For women, the difference in returns to education by level are 
negative from switching from informal to formal for basic school and lower 
secondary, and turns to be positive for any education level higher or equal to 
high school education. What turns to be large for both men and women is the 
returns to education of college and graduate studies from switching, which Ensayos  26
means that people with higher levels of education would earn even more in 
the formal sector relative to the informal. 
 
    More analysis could be done in this area, but this analysis goes beyond the 
purposes of this document at this stage. The next section shows the 
estimations of the different policy treatment effects from switching from 




Average conditional wage differences between formal and informal 
sector, Mexico 2000-2003 
Variable  2000/02  2000/03 2000/04 2001/01  2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2003/01 
Men               
Experience  0.34% 0.27%  0.45%  0.21%  0.12%  0.29%  0.13% 0.42% 0.35% 0.13% 0.42% 0.38% 
Experience 
Squared 
0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Basic 
School 
-14.83%  -18.69% -13.07% -13.33% -10.18% -9.30%  -13.17% -16.09% -8.00%  -10.21% -15.07% -7.60% 
Lower 
Secondary 
-13.13%  -21.46% -9.38%  -17.64% -9.86%  -12.28% -14.39% -18.17% -7.77%  -11.77% -18.24% -6.39% 
High School  -4.51% -14.63% -1.06%  -12.25% -0.57%  -3.60% -2.80% -7.00% 3.28%  -2.62% -9.63% 6.84% 
Technical 
Education 
6.26% -8.37% 2.85%  3.05% 12.23% 6.63%  2.16% 4.13% 13.55%  5.66% 0.08% 16.51% 
College  45.05% -25.67% 42.94%  24.13%  41.16%  41.82%  33.99% 34.05% 53.05% 39.13% 40.27% 57.83% 
Gaduate 
Studies 
84.17% 80.22%  6230%  77.62%  76.11%  156.55% 92.52% 95.00% 151.42%  157.98%  89.52% 106.39% 
Women               
Experience  0.56% 0.12%  0.83%  0.33%  0.35%  0.55%  0.72% 0.61% 0.50% 0.54% 0.64% 0.635 
Experience 
Squared 
-0.01% 0.00%  -0.01%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  -0.01% 0.00%  0.00%  -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 
Basic 
School 
-11.93%  -21.39% -20.94% -29.48% -9.10%  -18.03% -12.73% -14.07% -17.79% -12.91% -6.46%  -9.94% 
Lower 
Secondary 
-1.62% -10.87% -16.83% -27.07% -5.25%  -15.73% -1.15% -4.24% -17.42  -2.19% -0.67% -3.41% 
High School  19.05% 12.77%  5.98%  -11.40% 21.43%  2.22%  19.35% 21.67% 7.41%  18.28% 19.63% 16.41% 
Technical 
Education 
33.99% 26.11%  16.83%  4.71%  34.34%  13.15%  31.15% 32.54% 19.05% 36.44% 39.85% 29.64% 
College  77.83% 83.80%  58.78%  40.80%  85.37%  52.27%  81.96% 92.37% 44.84% 81.40% 82.96% 77.93% 
Graduate 
Studies 
19.01% 0.15%  133.83% 41.34%  55.02%  92.20%  192.34% 66.26%  74.55  234.02% 173.21% 159.31% 
Source: Own estimations using ENET 2000/02-2003/01. 
 
 
5.2. Treatment effects estimations 
 
    As it was discussed in Section 4 of this document, the purposes of this 
analysis is studying four policy treatment parameters for a worker from 
switching between informal to formal sector. After doing the TSLS 
estimation and the correction for self selection on each wage equation, I 
estimate the treatment effects for each quarter and each gender. Figure 11 
and Figure 12 below resume the treatment effects for comparing the wages 
for formal and informal sectors, dividing the analysis between men and 
women. The punctual estimations of these parameters are included in Table 
5a and Table 5b in the appendix of this document. 
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Figure 11 
Effect from switching informal to formal, men 2000-2003 
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Source: Own estimations using ENET 2000/02-2003/01. 
     
The OLS treatment effects resemble the unconditional average differences of 
wages observed in the previous section for both men and women. In this 
case, the OLS wage difference between formal and informal sector has been 
steadily reduced since 2000 for both men and women. Particularly, for this 
period the OLS treatment for men has reduced from 33.0 to 25.3 percent and 
for women has reduced from 54.2 to 45.3 percent. Nevertheless, as I will 
discuss below, the average wage difference seems to be dramatically 
different once we consider the self selection component and take into 
account this source of bias in the other conditional policy treatment effects. 
 
    The second policy effect considered is the ATE, defined as the average 
expected difference of wages once we identify the source of bias in the error 
terms of wages through the correspondent control function or Mills ratio. For 
the period studied in this document, ATE estimations are largely different 
with respect to the unconditional mean of wages and the OLS treatment 
estimators. For instance, for men in 2000/02 wage formal-informal gap 
reduces from 33.0 percent in OLS estimation, to 13.1 percent in the ATE 
difference. This results are qualitative similar to both men and women. Like 
the OLS and the unconditional measures, ATE also has been reducing for 
both men and women, from 13.1 and 19.3 percent in 2000/02, to 10.1 and 
17.8 percent respectively.  
 
The evidence suggests that, sorting across sectors indeed plays an important 
role in explaining the difference between wages, and that the observed wage Ensayos  28
gap may obey to other economic causes rather than low productivity of the 
informal sector labor units per se. ATE also shows reductions for the period 


















19 .4 % 20.4%







21 .3% 20.2% 20.4%
21 .7% 21 .8% 20.4%
14 .7 %
13 .0 % 14 .0 %
11.8 %
13 .6 % 12 .5 % 12 .4 %
10 .7 % 11.3 %

































































































Source: Own estimations using ENET 2000/02-2003/01. 
 
    The third policy parameter considered is the TT which shows the benefits 
of being formal, conditional on being a formal worker. For men, this 
parameter suggest that formal workers would have earned 14.3 percent less 
if they have switched from formal to informal in 2000/02, but the loss of 
switching reduces to 11.7 percent by 2003/01. For women, the loss from 
switching (or gains for being formal compared to be informal) have 
remained stable and around 20.4 percent. 
 
    The fourth policy parameter TUT shows the effect from switching from 
informal to formal sector, conditional on being informal employee. This 
effects turns to be the most revealing of the parameters estimated in this 
analysis. For men, the TUT estimations was of 7.5 percent in 2000/02, which 
dramatically contrast with the unconditional wage differences and the OLS 
treatment parameter. Moreover, the TUT effect have been reduced steadily 
during the period studied to be only 2.6 percent for men, and 8.0 percent for 
women. 
    Hence, this exercise shows the importance of self selection on formality 
choice, and how the treatment effect depends on the question we are Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  29 
interested in answering. Several new questions arise from these estimations 
such as the importance of the persistence of formal or informal employment 
on the wage inequality and the role of uncertainty on wages over the 
decisions of switching across types of works. In principle, expanding the 
analysis would help us to identify better the sources of differences between 
formal and informal wages. This expansion indeed is opportunities of a 





    This research proposal analyzed the wage differences between formal and 
informal urban labor markets in Mexico, for the 2000/02-2003/01 period 
testing an alternative definition of formality and using the treatment effect 
approach to calculate the gap between wages. In general, wage differences 
exists between these two markets, nevertheless, these differences changes 
dramatically once that choice between sectors and the self selection 
component is considered as a key issue of these wages. 
 
    In this document, four different policy treatment effects were estimated to 
calculate the wage differences. For men, the largest effects are obtained from 
analyzing the unconditional mean differences and the OLS treatment effect 
which gave a wage gap of around 33.0 per cent and steadily reduces in time 
to reach 25.3 from 2000/02 to 2003/01. In contrast, for the same period the 
ATE effect of formality reduces this gap estimation to 14.3 percent and 
steadily decreases to 11.7 percent for the same period studied. Furthermore, 
the TUT effect of informal workers seems to be even smaller and also 
decreasing in time, from 7.5 to 2.6 percent. These results are qualitatively 
similar to women. 
 
    The evidence suggests that self selection effects accounts for explaining a 
very important fraction of the average wage differentials between formal and 
informal wages. This also suggests that, for the last quarter I have data, the 
wage from moving from informal to formal sector would increase at the 
most 2.6 percent for men (8.0 percent for women) for the average informal 
worker, and maybe this switching is not done because there are other factors 
not considered in this first approach model such as matching of abilities and 
intertemporal decisions which may also influence the convergence between 
these two wages. 
 
    As areas of opportunity for this research, further robustness test must be 
performed to consider: 1) alternative definitions of formality; 2) inclusion of 
alternative variables in the outcome and choice models; and 3) consider the 
model for rural (low population) communities. Also, future expansions of the 
structural model should consider: 1) a multichoice model to consider the Ensayos  30
switching decision from unemployment to each of these to alternatives; and 
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Table 1. Formal and informal sector composition 
(All, Men, and Women, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2000/02  2000/03 2000/04 2001/01  2001/02 2001/03 
All                        
Total Employment  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Formal Employment  81.18 81.37 81.65 81.25 81.09 80.88 
Informal 
Employment  18.82 18.63 18.35 18.75 18.91 19.12 
 Self Employed & 
Employer  11.24 11.11 11.15 11.42 11.49 11.83 
Informal Salaried  7.58 7.52 7.21 7.33 7.42 7.29 
Men                   
Total Employment  63.72 64.30 63.48 64.09 63.79 64.39 
Formal Employment  52.69 53.15 52.59 52.89 52.56 52.87 
Informal 
Employment  11.03 11.14 10.89 11.20 11.23 11.52 
 Self Employed & 
Informal Employer  7.18 7.28 7.23 7.51 7.40 7.76 
Informal Salaried  3.85 3.86 3.66 3.69 3.83 3.76 
Women          
Total Employment  36.28 35.70 36.52 35.91 36.21 35.61 
Formal Employment  28.49 28.22 29.06 28.37 28.53 28.01 
Informal 
Employment  7.79 7.48 7.46 7.55 7.68 7.60 
Self Employed & 
Informal Employer  4.06 3.83 3.91 3.90 4.09 4.07 
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Table 1. Formal and informal sector composition 
(All, Men, and Women, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2001/04  2002/01 2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
All                    
Total Employment  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Formal Employment  81.09 80.86 80.95 80.53 80.53 80.64 
Informal Employment  18.91 19.14 19.05 19.47 19.47 19.36 
Self Employed & 
Employer  11.77 11.71 11.69 11.88 11.88 11.88 
Informal Salaried  7.14 7.43 7.36 7.59 7.58 7.48 
Men                   
Total Employment  63.37 64.03 63.53 68.98 63.80 63.57 
Formal Employment  52.16 52.54 52.15 52.53 52.07 52.02 
Informal Employment  11.21 11.49 11.38 11.73 11.74 11.55 
 Self Employed & 
Informal Employer  7.65 7.71 7.65 7.71 7.75 7.76 
Informal Salaried  3.56 3.78 3.73 4.02 3.99 3.79 
Women         
Total Employment  36.63 35.97 36.47 35.74 36.20 36.43 
Formal Employment  28.93 28.32 28.80 27.99 28.46 28.61 
Informal Employment  7.70 7.65 7.67 7.74 7.73 7.81 
Self Employed & 
Informal Employer  4.12 4.00 4.04 4.17 4.14 4.12 
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Table 2.a. Probit models analysis for participation in formal sector 
(Men, 2000‐2003)         
Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
a_expe ‐ 0.00191 ‐ 0.00224 ‐ 0.00194 ‐ 0.00206 ‐ 0.00189 ‐ 0.00200 
a_expe2  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
a_jefe(+)  0.02319  0.02295  0.01251  0.01770  0.01627  0.01576 
a_hcp(+)  0.03413  0.03742  0.04335  0.03751  0.03797  0.04094 
a_dprim(+)  0.08815  0.08917  0.07838  0.08458  0.08160  0.08144 
a_dsecun(+)  0.15308  0.15625  0.14711  0.15392  0.15543  0.15380 
a_dprepa(+)  0.16358  0.16425  0.15840  0.16453  0.16758  0.16747 
a_dpro~s(+)  0.20845  0.20754  0.20571  0.20787  0.21201  0.21191 
a_dtec~o(+)  0.14745  0.14972  0.14621  0.15159  0.15204  0.15238 
a_dpost(+)  0.14728  0.14759  0.14580  0.14980  0.14972  0.15450 
edo1(+)  0.05636  0.06424  0.06154  0.06827  0.07471  0.04771 
edo2(+)  0.01382  0.02530  0.01356  0.00474  0.02272 ‐ 0.00893 
edo3(+)  0.01799  0.00946 ‐ 0.01180 ‐ 0.02039  0.01119 ‐ 0.02330 
edo4(+) ‐ 0.01128  0.00390  0.00896 ‐ 0.01052  0.02648 ‐ 0.00466 
edo5(+)  0.01296  0.02788  0.02746  0.00127  0.02749  0.00111 
edo6(+)  0.02814  0.03400  0.02268  0.00834  0.03324  0.01373 
edo7(+) ‐ 0.03545 ‐ 0.02799 ‐ 0.01595 ‐ 0.02180  0.00762 ‐ 0.03025 
edo8(+)  0.01732  0.02920  0.03294  0.02484  0.04593  0.02104 
edo10(+)  0.01487  0.01639  0.01417 ‐ 0.00131  0.02418 ‐ 0.00215 
edo11(+)  0.00651  0.02611  0.02157  0.00344  0.02555  0.01169 
edo12(+) ‐ 0.06397 ‐ 0.04493 ‐ 0.06011 ‐ 0.06566 ‐ 0.05091 ‐ 0.07563 
edo13(+)  0.00672  0.02263  0.01747  0.00249  0.01983  0.00089 
edo14(+) ‐ 0.00946  0.01182  0.01258  0.00556  0.02839 ‐ 0.00291 
edo15(+)  0.00952  0.00926  0.00852  0.00251  0.02910 ‐ 0.00243 
edo16(+) ‐ 0.02446 ‐ 0.03737 ‐ 0.03660 ‐ 0.05563 ‐ 0.03564 ‐ 0.08169 
edo17(+) ‐ 0.09627 ‐ 0.08235 ‐ 0.08004 ‐ 0.13086 ‐ 0.08513 ‐ 0.12608 
edo18(+) ‐ 0.03346 ‐ 0.02704 ‐ 0.04006 ‐ 0.03748 ‐ 0.01019 ‐ 0.04310 
edo19(+) ‐ 0.00854  0.00182 ‐ 0.00809 ‐ 0.00814 ‐ 0.00107 ‐ 0.01595 
edo20(+) ‐ 0.07317 ‐ 0.05863 ‐ 0.07470 ‐ 0.09037 ‐ 0.06805 ‐ 0.10692 
edo21(+) ‐ 0.02380 ‐ 0.00265  0.00067 ‐ 0.03353 ‐ 0.00558 ‐ 0.02447 
edo22(+)  0.05637  0.04646  0.04368  0.02390  0.05387  0.02576 
edo23(+)  0.03668  0.05851  0.06110  0.04645  0.06117  0.03265 
edo24(+)  0.00650  0.01170  0.00800 ‐ 0.01625  0.00627 ‐ 0.00267 
edo25(+) ‐ 0.02216 ‐ 0.02276 ‐ 0.02711 ‐ 0.04928 ‐ 0.00320 ‐ 0.02563 
edo26(+) ‐ 0.01517  0.00638  0.00976  0.00354  0.02587 ‐ 0.02612 
edo27(+) ‐ 0.00067  0.01664 ‐ 0.01537 ‐ 0.01943  0.00833 ‐ 0.00048 
edo28(+)  0.00220 ‐ 0.00312  0.00056 ‐ 0.02306  0.00293 ‐ 0.00607 
edo30(+) ‐ 0.01474 ‐ 0.00900 ‐ 0.02042 ‐ 0.02531  0.00038 ‐ 0.02561 
edo31(+)  0.01337  0.00794  0.00748 ‐ 0.00812  0.01007  0.00380 
edo32(+) ‐ 0.02046 ‐ 0.00279  0.00430 ‐ 0.05948 ‐ 0.00039 ‐ 0.01990 
Num. Obs  90767  93504  94529  91948  92074  90627 
LR chi2(40)  9914.72  10271.62  10309.28  9907.39  10153.04  9763.93 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Table 2.a. Probit models analysis for participation in formal sector 
(Men, 2000‐2003)         
Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
a_expe ‐ 0.00196 ‐ 0.00177 ‐ 0.00191 ‐ 0.00218 ‐ 0.00178 ‐ 0.00181 
a_expe2  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00001  0.00000  0.00001 
a_jefe(+)  0.01577  0.01211  0.01711  0.01514  0.02050  0.02042 
a_hcp(+)  0.04085  0.04623  0.03913  0.04530  0.03918  0.03545 
a_dprim(+)  0.08269  0.08444  0.08333  0.07823  0.09238  0.08357 
a_dsecun(+)  0.15366  0.16069  0.15666  0.15276  0.16592  0.16031 
a_dprepa(+)  0.16697  0.17030  0.16992  0.16858  0.17796  0.17411 
a_dpro~s(+)  0.21462  0.21915  0.21770  0.21725  0.22855  0.22284 
a_dtec~o(+)  0.15026  0.15539  0.15202  0.15037  0.15760  0.15441 
a_dpost(+)  0.15204  0.15504  0.15455  0.15810  0.15807  0.15734 
edo1(+)  0.06249  0.06368  0.07369  0.07657  0.06198  0.05639 
edo2(+)  0.00468  0.00607  0.02738  0.02554  0.02900  0.00275 
edo3(+)  0.01295  0.02412  0.03212  0.02449  0.00869 ‐ 0.00089 
edo4(+) ‐ 0.00165 ‐ 0.00165  0.01087  0.01041  0.00484 ‐ 0.01760 
edo5(+)  0.01218  0.00128  0.02024  0.00621  0.00511  0.00054 
edo6(+)  0.00578  0.02936  0.03556  0.03240  0.02656 ‐ 0.00169 
edo7(+) ‐ 0.00744 ‐ 0.00948  0.00367 ‐ 0.02489 ‐ 0.03102 ‐ 0.03305 
edo8(+)  0.02194  0.03721  0.04650  0.03952  0.04562  0.01679 
edo10(+) ‐ 0.00182  0.00594  0.01637  0.00608  0.00667 ‐ 0.00342 
edo11(+)  0.01649  0.02072  0.02690  0.02156  0.02082  0.00464 
edo12(+) ‐ 0.05649 ‐ 0.05049 ‐ 0.04541 ‐ 0.04663 ‐ 0.07475 ‐ 0.04844 
edo13(+)  0.00008  0.01718  0.02417  0.00756  0.01244  0.01122 
edo14(+)  0.00526  0.01923  0.04259  0.02223  0.01176  0.02015 
edo15(+)  0.01168  0.01906  0.02676  0.01566  0.02579  0.00742 
edo16(+) ‐ 0.03826 ‐ 0.03858 ‐ 0.03567 ‐ 0.05241 ‐ 0.02621 ‐ 0.03371 
edo17(+) ‐ 0.12517 ‐ 0.12175 ‐ 0.10065 ‐ 0.17628 ‐ 0.14377 ‐ 0.15515 
edo18(+) ‐ 0.02913 ‐ 0.02794 ‐ 0.03114 ‐ 0.01945 ‐ 0.00911 ‐ 0.05047 
edo19(+) ‐ 0.00142 ‐ 0.01712  0.00289 ‐ 0.00545 ‐ 0.00411 ‐ 0.03044 
edo20(+) ‐ 0.06712 ‐ 0.05866 ‐ 0.01851 ‐ 0.03926 ‐ 0.06544 ‐ 0.07270 
edo21(+) ‐ 0.01198 ‐ 0.01355  0.00918 ‐ 0.03782 ‐ 0.02652 ‐ 0.04667 
edo22(+)  0.03578  0.02939  0.04987  0.02295  0.05298  0.03022 
edo23(+)  0.05090  0.05452  0.04521  0.03969  0.05245  0.02834 
edo24(+)  0.01731  0.01019  0.02640  0.02172  0.02204  0.00566 
edo25(+) ‐ 0.03618 ‐ 0.04218 ‐ 0.00962 ‐ 0.03380 ‐ 0.02552 ‐ 0.03513 
edo26(+) ‐ 0.01408 ‐ 0.00800  0.01943  0.01128  0.02071  0.00873 
edo27(+)  0.01031  0.00619  0.00461 ‐ 0.00285 ‐ 0.00492 ‐ 0.02797 
edo28(+) ‐ 0.00025 ‐ 0.00256  0.01306  0.00390 ‐ 0.00549 ‐ 0.02244 
edo30(+) ‐ 0.02356 ‐ 0.02311 ‐ 0.01393 ‐ 0.03772 ‐ 0.03016 ‐ 0.04375 
edo31(+) ‐ 0.00555 ‐ 0.00623  0.01396  0.00156 ‐ 0.00660 ‐ 0.00626 
edo32(+)  0.00243 ‐ 0.01792  0.00985 ‐ 0.02793 ‐ 0.01129 ‐ 0.01863 
Num. Obs  91617  89877  89114  87109  88142  87438 
LR chi2(40)  10048.55  9704.62  9774.84  9531.52  10149.6  9549.11 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 










Variable  2000/02 2000/03 2000/04 2001/01 2001/02 2001/03 
a_numhij    ‐0.00448 ‐0.00551 ‐0.00718 ‐0.00657 ‐0.00648 ‐0.00503 
a_jefe(+)  0.00383 0.00534 ‐0.00115 0.01218 0.01172 0.00548 
a_expe    ‐0.00097 ‐0.00227 ‐0.00106 ‐0.00138 ‐0.00169 ‐0.00199 
a_expe2    ‐0.00002 0.00000 ‐0.00002 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 0.00000 
a_dprim(+)  0.10184 0.10727 0.09670 0.09655 0.09450 0.09700 
a_dsecun(+)  0.18168 0.17715 0.16372 0.16674 0.16635 0.17449 
a_dprepa(+)  0.18872 0.18562 0.17788 0.18437 0.18414 0.19279 
a_dpro~s(+)  0.26993 0.26095 0.26227 0.26559 0.26687 0.26288 
a_dtec~o(+)  0.23283 0.22524 0.21544 0.21946 0.21923 0.22502 
a_dpost(+)  0.16713 0.16225 0.15543 0.16200 0.16451 0.16793 
edo1(+)  0.08482 0.08157 0.08155 0.07701 0.08496 0.08379 
edo2(+)    0.10393 0.10008 0.08850 0.10534 0.09560 0.10184 
edo3(+)  0.01870 0.03937 0.01529 0.02457 0.02849 0.01069 
edo4(+) ‐ 0.00411 ‐0.00253 ‐0.01843 ‐0.02379 ‐0.01327 ‐0.00851 
edo5(+)  0.03293 0.04218 0.03339 0.03081 0.02514 0.03691 
edo6(+) ‐ 0.00868 0.01874 0.01124 ‐0.00487 ‐0.00378 ‐0.01990 
edo7(+) ‐ 0.06523 ‐0.05872 ‐0.04581 ‐0.05794 ‐0.04645 ‐0.05928 
edo8(+)  0.11495 0.11688 0.10736 0.11063 0.12197 0.12195 
edo10(+)  0.04183 0.02879 0.03401 0.03891 0.02771 0.02497 
edo11(+)   0.04382 0.04170 0.04029 0.04272 0.03788 0.05082 
edo12(+) ‐ 0.04844 ‐0.04159 ‐0.01543 ‐0.01028 ‐0.01507 0.00801 
edo13(+)  0.07059 0.06676 0.05010 0.05542 0.06133 0.06012 
edo14(+)  0.01657 0.02637 0.01785 0.01470 0.01041 0.01145 
edo15(+)  0.04023 0.03132 0.02470 0.03616 0.02741 0.02550 
edo16(+)  0.00361 ‐0.00638 ‐0.00870 0.00883 0.00045 0.01448 
edo17(+) ‐ 0.02111 ‐0.03169 ‐0.04511 ‐0.04436 ‐0.02918 ‐0.02540 
edo18(+)  0.00118 ‐0.01274 ‐0.02902 ‐0.02662 ‐0.03427 ‐0.03216 
edo19(+)  0.02330 0.02510 0.01657 0.01302 0.00578 ‐0.00128 
edo20(+)  0.01939 0.01170 ‐0.02861 ‐0.00859 ‐0.02801 0.00196 
edo21(+)  0.04129 0.03065 0.01825 0.00946 0.01366 0.01237 
edo22(+)  0.06497 0.05458 0.03562 0.06078 0.05513 0.04001 
edo23(+)  0.04487 0.04726 0.04794 0.04455 0.04942 0.03985 
edo24(+)  0.03306 0.02962 0.02095 0.03176 0.01672 0.04209 
edo25(+) ‐ 0.03002 ‐0.02677 ‐0.03590 ‐0.03431 ‐0.05358 ‐0.03698 
edo26(+)  0.03215 0.02943 0.02244 0.02080 0.01016 ‐0.00246 
edo27(+) ‐ 0.02675 ‐0.01725 ‐0.03371 ‐0.04720 ‐0.04745 ‐0.03193 
edo28(+)  0.07067 0.06014 0.04718 0.05113 0.04648 0.05668 
edo30(+) ‐ 0.04751 ‐0.05205 ‐0.05506 ‐0.05736 ‐0.05240 ‐0.05381 
edo31(+)  0.01540 0.02006 0.02613 0.01559 ‐0.00445 0.01712 
edo32(+)  0.05291 0.05320 0.04828 0.01728 0.03788 0.04880 
Num. Obs  51679 51919 54391 51527 52268 50112 
LR chi2(40)  11440.72 11006.67 11826.23 11177.14 11387.3 10671.48 
Prob > chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 










Variable  2001/04 2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2003/01 2001/04 
a_numhij    ‐0.00726 ‐0.00695 ‐0.01008 ‐0.00929 ‐0.00595 ‐0.00977 ‐0.00726 
a_jefe(+)  0.00814 0.00782 0.01099 0.00430 0.00837 0.01988 0.00814 
a_expe    ‐0.00107 ‐0.00103 ‐0.00116 ‐0.00121 ‐0.00140 ‐0.00083 ‐0.00107 
a_expe2    ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00001 
a_dprim(+)  0.08427 0.08717 0.08729 0.09484 0.08310 0.09248 0.08427 
a_dsecun(+)  0.16238 0.16607 0.16866 0.17467 0.16511 0.17266 0.16238 
a_dprepa(+)  0.18291 0.18568 0.18596 0.19288 0.18628 0.19274 0.18291 
a_dpro~s(+)  0.27033 0.27316 0.27122 0.27248 0.27539 0.28145 0.27033 
a_dtec~o(+)  0.21286 0.21910 0.21877 0.22228 0.21579 0.22028 0.21286 
a_dpost(+)  0.16453 0.16584 0.16506 0.17126 0.16732 0.17016 0.16453 
edo1(+)  0.07811 0.05703 0.07383 0.08572 0.06749 0.05817 0.07811 
edo2(+)    0.08886 0.08923 0.08593 0.08066 0.09217 0.07580 0.08886 
edo3(+)  0.02471 0.02730 0.00531 ‐0.00182 0.01725 0.00215 0.02471 
edo4(+) ‐ 0.04131 ‐0.00999 ‐0.00949 ‐0.02106 ‐0.01442 ‐0.01002 ‐0.04131 
edo5(+)  0.01362 0.02609 0.01816 0.02687 0.02738 0.02012 0.01362 
edo6(+) ‐ 0.00557 ‐0.01684 ‐0.00695 ‐0.02145 ‐0.01524 ‐0.03478 ‐0.00557 
edo7(+) ‐ 0.07646 ‐0.06912 ‐0.03736 ‐0.06038 ‐0.04516 ‐0.05000 ‐0.07646 
edo8(+)  0.10392 0.10539 0.10494 0.10681 0.11044 0.09808 0.10392 
edo10(+)  0.01189 0.02209 0.02743 0.02812 0.03329 0.01771 0.01189 
edo11(+)   0.03745 0.03533 0.04697 0.03543 0.03799 0.02333 0.03745 
edo12(+) ‐ 0.01268 ‐0.03306 ‐0.03281 ‐0.05131 ‐0.03759 ‐0.04358 ‐0.01268 
edo13(+)  0.02320 0.03078 0.04661 0.04295 0.05275 0.04607 0.02320 
edo14(+)  0.00520 0.00951 0.02709 0.02632 0.01422 0.02619 0.00520 
edo15(+)  0.01718 0.01669 0.03508 0.03825 0.03057 0.02868 0.01718 
edo16(+)  0.02408 0.02015 0.01568 ‐0.01175 0.00234 ‐0.01408 0.02408 
edo17(+) ‐ 0.05887 ‐0.02396 ‐0.04432 ‐0.08040 ‐0.06432 ‐0.10548 ‐0.05887 
edo18(+) ‐ 0.02140 ‐0.01585 ‐0.02707 ‐0.02783 ‐0.01750 ‐0.01807 ‐0.02140 
edo19(+)  0.00366 ‐0.00583 0.00771 ‐0.00422 0.00356 ‐0.00293 0.00366 
edo20(+) ‐ 0.02883 ‐0.02450 0.01446 ‐0.01073 0.01877 ‐0.02031 ‐0.02883 
edo21(+)  0.01075 0.02038 0.02137 0.00590 0.01018 ‐0.01501 0.01075 
edo22(+)  0.03646 0.05402 0.05430 0.04084 0.06782 0.05147 0.03646 
edo23(+)  0.02583 0.04261 0.03390 0.02855 0.03284 0.03220 0.02583 
edo24(+)  0.02282 0.02399 0.03446 0.02316 0.03947 0.01389 0.02282 
edo25(+) ‐ 0.04844 ‐0.06015 ‐0.04319 ‐0.06989 ‐0.04890 ‐0.06896 ‐0.04844 
edo26(+) ‐ 0.01082 ‐0.01439 ‐0.02240 ‐0.00590 0.00850 ‐0.00091 ‐0.01082 
edo27(+) ‐ 0.05064 ‐0.06482 ‐0.05847 ‐0.05629 ‐0.06138 ‐0.04010 ‐0.05064 
edo28(+)  0.02718 0.04176 0.05465 0.04503 0.04633 0.03428 0.02718 
edo30(+) ‐ 0.06244 ‐0.05338 ‐0.04529 ‐0.06759 ‐0.05606 ‐0.07480 ‐0.06244 
edo31(+) ‐ 0.01427 0.00944 0.00589 ‐0.00380 0.01362 0.00679 ‐0.01427 
edo32(+)  0.03679 0.05834 0.06000 0.04903 0.05192 0.05820 0.03679 
Num. Obs  52955 50489 51146 48441 50006 50101 52955 
LR chi2(40)  11300.82 10925.57 10948.9 10423.9 10714.11 10479.35 11300.82 
Prob > chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 










Variable  2000/02  2000/03 2000/04 2001/01 2001/02 2001/03
a_expe  0.0303  0.0306 0.0307 0.0305 0.0307 0.0309
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐ 0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004
a_dprim ‐ 0.3020 ‐ 0.2869 ‐0.1903 ‐0.2026 ‐0.1728 ‐0.1496
a_dsecun ‐ 0.4578 ‐ 0.4342 ‐0.2950 ‐0.3285 ‐0.2823 ‐0.2712
a_dprepa ‐ 0.4232 ‐ 0.3831 ‐0.2268 ‐0.2791 ‐0.2251 ‐0.2083
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.4118 ‐ 0.3911 ‐0.2189 ‐0.2688 ‐0.2144 ‐0.2009
a_dprofes  0.0111  0.0534 0.2358 0.1734 0.2316 0.2155
a_dpost  0.3957  0.4103 0.5870 0.4990 0.6032 0.5183
mills_f_h  1.8407  1.7621 1.5268 1.6192 1.4461 1.4914
_cons  3.1929  3.1467 3.0025 3.0993 3.0619 3.0584
Num Obs  75055  77300 78310 75880 75870 74413
F  3766.91  3865.58 3945.48 3716.49 3686.5 3548.83
Prob (F)  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R 2  0.3112  0.3104 0.312 0.306 0.3043 0.3003







Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
a_expe  0.0269  0.0279 0.0262 0.0283 0.0295 0.0280
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐ 0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004
a_dprim ‐ 0.1538 ‐ 0.1000 ‐0.0595 ‐0.0693 ‐0.0711 ‐0.0567
a_dsecun ‐ 0.3265 ‐ 0.2196 ‐0.2013 ‐0.1521 ‐0.1837 ‐0.1484
a_dprepa ‐ 0.3780 ‐ 0.2368 ‐0.2162 ‐0.1566 ‐0.2194 ‐0.1723
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.4743 ‐ 0.3073 ‐0.2473 ‐0.2993 ‐0.3367 ‐0.2671
a_dprofes ‐ 0.4394 ‐ 0.2033 ‐0.1936 ‐0.0679 ‐0.1801 ‐0.2027
a_dpost ‐ 0.4460 ‐ 0.3920 ‐0.0361 ‐0.2771 ‐0.1579 ‐1.0472
mills_i_h  0.9385  0.8051 0.7883 0.6806 0.6829 0.6812
_cons  1.0855  1.2108 1.2856 1.4438 1.5115 1.5095
Num Obs  15712  16204 16219 16068 16204 16214
F  222.88  237.96 233.85 218.74 203.47 204.57
Prob (F)  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R 2  0.1133  0.1168 0.1149 0.1092 0.1016 0.102














Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
a_expe  0.0295 0.0299 0.0290 0.0296 0.0289 0.0300 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 
a_dprim ‐ 0.2020 ‐0.1745 ‐0.1891 ‐0.1648 ‐0.2519 ‐0.2110 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.3326 ‐0.2849 ‐0.3634 ‐0.3114 ‐0.4261 ‐0.3838 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.2822 ‐0.2139 ‐0.3397 ‐0.2795 ‐0.4083 ‐0.3491 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.2536 ‐0.2051 ‐0.3077 ‐0.2366 ‐0.3768 ‐0.3076 
a_dprofes  0.1592 0.2184 0.0756 0.1375 ‐0.0031 0.0709 
a_dpost  0.4726 0.5614 0.4237 0.4923 0.3601 0.4238 
mills_f_h  1.5452 1.3842 1.6531 1.5620 1.5936 1.5095 
_cons  3.1622 3.1202 3.2716 3.2141 3.3790 3.3091 
Num Obs  75411 73746 73152 71209 71930 71557 
F  3846.79 3493.69 3634.44 3536.76 3554.66 3432.38 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.3147 0.2989 0.309 0.3089 0.3079 0.3016 







Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
a_expe  0.0282 0.0258 0.0255 0.0283 0.0246 0.0262 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 
a_dprim ‐ 0.0703 ‐0.0136 ‐0.1091 ‐0.0627 ‐0.1013 ‐0.1351 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.1887 ‐0.1032 ‐0.2858 ‐0.1938 ‐0.2438 ‐0.3200 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.2542 ‐0.1439 ‐0.3725 ‐0.2533 ‐0.3120 ‐0.4175 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.2752 ‐0.2464 ‐0.4432 ‐0.2932 ‐0.3777 ‐0.4727 
a_dprofes ‐ 0.1807 ‐0.1221 ‐0.4549 ‐0.2538 ‐0.4058 ‐0.5075 
a_dpost ‐ 0.4526 ‐0.3886 ‐1.0905 ‐1.0875 ‐0.5351 ‐0.6401 
mills_i_h  0.7087 0.6515 0.8638 0.7193 0.7833 0.8215 
_cons  1.5164 1.6205 1.4582 1.5667 1.6044 1.6296 
Num Obs  16206 16131 15962 15900 16212 15881 
F  218.02 195.12 205.08 214.31 214.52 184.08 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.1081 0.0982 0.1037 0.1082 0.1065 0.0945 
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Table 4.a. TSLS wage equation in formal sector 
(Women, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
a_expe  0.0358 0.0358 0.0363 0.0340 0.0335 0.0337 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 
a_dprim ‐ 0.2889 ‐0.3740 ‐0.3263 ‐0.3538 ‐0.2294 ‐0.2448 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.3903 ‐0.4609 ‐0.3890 ‐0.4572 ‐0.3053 ‐0.3438 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.2651 ‐0.3453 ‐0.3004 ‐0.3904 ‐0.1929 ‐0.2751 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.2895 ‐0.3778 ‐0.2952 ‐0.3870 ‐0.2065 ‐0.2817 
a_dprofes  0.2313 0.1349 0.2178 0.0977 0.2934 0.2257 
a_dpost  0.5882 0.4987 0.5700 0.4372 0.6214 0.5646 
mills_f_h  1.2666 1.3166 1.2788 1.3720 1.1860 1.2754 
_cons  2.8428 2.9190 2.8870 3.0490 2.8819 2.9361 
Num Obs  40578 41035 43277 40699 41177 39415 
F  2476.49 2387.08 2804.17 2525.26 2447.01 2293.34 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.3546 0.3437 0.3684 0.3584 0.3485 0.3437 







Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
a_expe  0.0302 0.0347 0.0279 0.0307 0.0299 0.0283 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 
a_dprim ‐ 0.1696 ‐0.1600 ‐0.1169 ‐0.0590 ‐0.1384 ‐0.0645 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.3741 ‐0.3522 ‐0.2207 ‐0.1865 ‐0.2528 ‐0.1865 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.4557 ‐0.4730 ‐0.3603 ‐0.2764 ‐0.4071 ‐0.2974 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.6294 ‐0.6389 ‐0.4634 ‐0.4341 ‐0.5499 ‐0.4132 
a_dprofes ‐ 0.5470 ‐0.7031 ‐0.3700 ‐0.3103 ‐0.5604 ‐0.2970 
a_dpost  0.3981 0.4972 ‐0.7683 0.0238 0.0712 ‐0.3574 
mills_f_h  1.0052 1.0607 0.9053 0.8874 0.9087 0.8234 
_cons  0.8900 0.7739 0.9986 1.0038 1.1003 1.1410 
Num Obs  11101 10884 11114 10828 11091 10697 
F  171.19 169.01 161.64 166.89 138.47 143.1 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.122 0.1227 0.1158 0.1219 0.1011 0.1075 







 Los salarios del sector formal e informal en México...  41 
Table 4.a. TSLS wage equation in formal sector 
(Women, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
a_expe  0.0328 0.0315 0.0319 0.0325 0.0307 0.0318 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004 
a_dprim ‐ 0.2100 ‐0.2197 ‐0.2057 ‐0.2333 ‐0.1930 ‐0.2111 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.2972 ‐0.3153 ‐0.3180 ‐0.3266 ‐0.2950 ‐0.3090 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.2105 ‐0.2287 ‐0.2199 ‐0.2584 ‐0.2299 ‐0.2283 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.2001 ‐0.2314 ‐0.1937 ‐0.2287 ‐0.2003 ‐0.2087 
a_dprofes  0.2829 0.2484 0.2790 0.2226 0.2650 0.2577 
a_dpost  0.6100 0.5937 0.6240 0.5315 0.5616 0.6076 
mills_f_h  1.2635 1.2474 1.1871 1.1846 1.1802 1.2031 
_cons  2.9258 2.9960 2.9541 2.9907 2.9992 3.0294 
Num Obs  41819 39748 40392 37944 39325 39356 
F  2734.15 2374.82 2485.85 2165.94 2348.37 2428.94 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.3705 0.3497 0.3565 0.3394 0.3496 0.3572 







Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
a_expe  0.0256 0.0254 0.0270 0.0271 0.0244 0.0255 
a_expe2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 
a_dprim ‐ 0.0827 ‐0.0790 ‐0.0279 ‐0.1042 ‐0.1283 ‐0.1116 
a_dsecun ‐ 0.2857 ‐0.2729 ‐0.1439 ‐0.3047 ‐0.2883 ‐0.2750 
a_dprepa ‐ 0.4040 ‐0.4454 ‐0.2940 ‐0.4411 ‐0.4262 ‐0.3924 
a_dtecnico ‐ 0.5116 ‐0.5569 ‐0.3842 ‐0.5931 ‐0.5988 ‐0.5052 
a_dprofes ‐ 0.5367 ‐0.6754 ‐0.1694 ‐0.5914 ‐0.5646 ‐0.5216 
a_dpost ‐ 1.3135 ‐0.0689 ‐0.1215 ‐1.8087 ‐1.1705 ‐0.9856 
mills_f_h  0.9577 0.9981 0.7831 0.9202 0.8901 0.8676 
_cons  1.1175 1.1281 1.2617 1.2481 1.3530 1.3929 
Num Obs  11136 10741 10754 10497 10681 10745 
F  150.49 145.57 136.52 123.82 113.9 123.99 
Prob (F)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R 2  0.1085 0.1088 0.1026 0.0961 0.0876 0.0942 
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Table 5.a. Treatment effects of switching from informal to formal 
(Men, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Observed  2.7947 2.8038 2.8652 2.8865 2.9311  2.9211 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Observed  2.4650 2.5039 2.5552 2.6024 2.6531  2.6423 
Mean Logw – Formal OLS 
estimate  2.7947 2.8037 2.8652 2.8865 2.9311  2.9210 
Mean Logw – Informal OLS 
estimate  2.4651 2.5040 2.5552 2.6024 2.6531  2.6423 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Corrected  2.7506 2.7613 2.8223 2.8443 2.8884  2.8795 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Corrected  2.6197 2.6569 2.7124 2.7430 2.7802  2.7580 
Δ Ordinary Least Squares  0.3295 0.2998 0.3099 0.2841 0.2780  0.2788 
Δ Average Treatment Effect  0.1310 0.1044 0.1099 0.1013 0.1082  0.1215 
Δ Treatment on the Treated  0.1426 0.1148 0.1202 0.1137 0.1238  0.1378 
Δ Treatment on the 






Variable  2000/02  2000/03  2000/04  2001/01  2001/02  2001/03 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Observed  2.7174 2.7050 2.7833 2.8027 2.8439  2.8114 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Observed  2.1749 2.2187 2.2548 2.2991 2.3299  2.3244 
Mean Logw – Formal OLS 
estimate  2.7174 2.7050 2.7833 2.8028 2.8439  2.8114 
Mean Logw – Informal OLS 
estimate  2.1749 2.2186 2.2548 2.2990 2.3299  2.3244 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Corrected  2.6325 2.6303 2.7039 2.7218 2.7638  2.7342 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Corrected  2.4399 2.4540 2.5105 2.5516 2.5537  2.5399 
Δ Ordinary Least Squares  0.5425 0.4864 0.5285 0.5038 0.5140  0.4870 
Δ Average Treatment Effect  0.1926 0.1763 0.1934 0.1702 0.2101  0.1943 
Δ Treatment on the Treated  0.2050 0.1887 0.2071 0.1840 0.2299  0.2130 
Δ Treatment on the 
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Table 5.a. Treatment effects of switching from informal to formal 
(Men, 2000‐2003) 
Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Observed  2.9519 2.9903 2.9839 2.9976 3.0271  3.0433 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Observed  2.6681 2.7230 2.7146 2.7237 2.7523  2.7908 
Mean Logw – Formal OLS 
estimate  2.9519 2.9904 2.9839 2.9976 3.0272  3.0434 
Mean Logw – Informal OLS 
estimate  2.6681 2.7231 2.7147 2.7237 2.7522  2.7908 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Corrected  2.9088 2.9479 2.9411 2.9544 2.9827  3.0022 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Corrected  2.8023 2.8465 2.8348 2.8377 2.8786  2.9013 
Δ Ordinary Least Squares  0.2838 0.2673 0.2693 0.2740 0.2750  0.2525 
Δ Average Treatment Effect  0.1065 0.1014 0.1063 0.1167 0.1041  0.1008 
Δ Treatment on the Treated  0.1207 0.1169 0.1229 0.1345 0.1201  0.1175 
Δ Treatment on the 
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Table 5.b. Treatment effects of switching from informal to formal 
(Women, 2000‐2003)        
Variable  2001/04  2002/01  2002/02  2002/03  2002/04  2003/01 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Observed  2.8838 2.9109 2.9134 2.9010 2.9477  2.9692 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Observed  2.3736 2.4204 2.4248 2.4454 2.4814  2.5163 
Mean Logw – Formal OLS 
estimate  2.8838 2.9110 2.9135 2.9011 2.9478  2.9692 
Mean Logw – Informal OLS 
estimate  2.3736 2.4203 2.4247 2.4455 2.4817  2.5161 
Mean Logw – Formal 
Corrected  2.8026 2.8294 2.8345 2.8231 2.8700  2.8892 
Mean Logw – Informal 
Corrected  2.5990 2.6476 2.6499 2.6323 2.6772  2.7114 
Δ Ordinary Least Squares  0.5102 0.4906 0.4888 0.4555 0.4661  0.4531 
Δ Average Treatment Effect  0.2036 0.1818 0.1846 0.1908 0.1928  0.1778 
Δ Treatment on the Treated  0.2248 0.2019 0.2036 0.2171 0.2175  0.2045 
Δ Treatment on the 
Untreated  0.1240 0.1072 0.1132 0.0958 0.1020  0.0800 
Source: Own estimations using ENET 2000:02 ‐ 2003:01. 
 